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RESCISSION FOR BREACH OF SELLER'S WARRANTY
In the case of American Sugar Refining Company v. Martin-
Nelly Grocery Conpanyj it was held that the buyer of goods could
not rescind an executed sale for breach of the seller's warranty.
Approximately eight months later the same court rendered a con-
trary decision in the case of Kemble v. Wiltison,2 without over-
ruling, distinguishing or even mentioning the first case. The
present status of the West Virginia law on this point is therefore
doubtful. It is the purpose of this note to discuss these and other
cases in an effort to reconcile them and to state the correct govern-
ing principles.
Sales cases commonly fall into two broad classes: (1) contracts
for the sale of unascertained goods and (2) sales of specific goods.
190 W. Va. 730, 111 S. E. 759 (1922). See Comment (1931) 29 MIli. L.
REv. 794.
2 92 W. Va. 32, 114 S. E. 369 (1922).
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In the latter case there may or may not be a previous executory
contract of sale. In cases of this type, in the absence of evidence of
a contrary intention, the title to the specific goods passes to the
buyer at the moment the bargain is made, without reference to
the time of delivery or payment of the purchase price. For ex-
ample, A says to B, "I offer to sell you this book for $10.00." B
replies, "I accept." The title to the book is, at that moment, vested
in B. In cases of type (1) the title cannot pass to the buyer until
that which is unaseertained becomes definite, by mutual assent of
the parties. A agrees to sell a carload of wheat to B and B agrees
to take and pay for it. Title to any specific carload of wheat can-
not pass to B until A "appropriates" a specific carload to the per-
formance of the contract. The title to the wheat becomes vested in
B from the moment of A's act of appropriation, if the wheat is of
the kind and quality agreed upon. On the contrary, if the goods
do not conform to the contract, the title cannot pass unless and
until B "accepts" the goods tendered by A. "Acceptance", in
this connection, means simply that the buyer consents to become
the owner of the specific goods offered by the seller in performance
of the pre-existing contract. Unless otherwise agreed, the seller
must permit the buyer to inspect the goods. The buyer must either
accept or reject them, and their retention for an unreasonable
length of time without objection, constitutes an acceptance.3
In a word, the concept of acceptance by the buyer necessarily
embodies the principle that having consented to become the owner
of the tendered goods, he cannot thereafter reverse the transaction
and revest the title in the seller unless the defect is latent. On the
other band, if the buyer merely "receives" the goods, as dis-
tinguished from "accepting" them, he may return them.4
Where the defect is latent, i.e., the failure of the goods to
conform to the warranty, express or implied, cannot be ascertained
by ordinary inspection, it is probably inaccurate to state that the
title does not pass to the buyer in the interval between his receipt
of the goods and the time when the defect is discovered. In such
cases, the warranty should be treated as a condition subsequent,
breach of which permits the buyer to revest the title in the seller.
On the other hand, if the defect is readily discoverable, then appro-
. These common-law principles are codified in the Uniform Sales Act §§
47 & 48.
4 This distinction in terminology is made by the Uniform Sales Act, §
69(1) (d). After acceptance of the goods, "the right of rescission is gone."
Gerli & Co. v. Mistletoe Silk Mills, 80 N. J. L. 128, 76 Atl. 335 (1910).
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priation by the seller of goods conforming to the warranty is gen-
erally treated as a condition precedent to the passage of title.
Where the sale is of specific goods, the buyer may or may
not previously have examined them, or the defect may be one
which could not readily be discovered by examination. He should
have the right to compel the seller to take back the title because
he consented to become the owner upon the mistaken assumption
that the specific goods were of a certain charactei. This reason
fails to apply to the case of unspecified goods, except where the
defect is latent, because the buyer is not deemed to have "accepted"
them unless and until he has had a reasonable opportunity to
examine and test them for the purpose of ascertaining whether
they are in conformity with the contract, and therefore to deter-
mine whether he will become their owner.
Rescission must therefore be considered in two aspects. (1) If
the buyer does not accept defective goods tendered in performance
of a pre-existing contract for the sale of unspecified goods, he may
rescind the contract. No question of rescission of the sale (i.e., the
passing of the property interest in the goods) is involved. If he
does accept them, unless the defect is latent, he cannot rescind
either the sale or the contract, but may recover damages for breach
of warranty either in an independent action or by way of recoup-
ment. (2) If the case involves the sale of specific goods, the buyer
may rescind both the sale and the contract provided he does so
promptly and does not waive the right in some manner. The right
of rejection in the case of unspecified goods corresponds to the
right of rescission in the case of specific goods.
Little distinction is made, and none should be made, between
cases of express warranties and implied warranties. If the sale is
by description, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall
conform to it; if by sample, that the goods shall conform to the
sample; if sold for a particular purpose, that the goods shall be
fit for that purpose.5
Returning now to the two West Virginia cases mentioned, it
will be noted that in the American Sugar case0 there was a con-
tract for the sale of unspecified goods, viz., extra fine granulated
sugar. The sugar was received by defendant buyer on September
21, 1920. On September 30, defendant accepted three drafts for
5 The warranties paraphrased above are set forth in detail in the Uniform
Sales Act §§ 14 & 15.
s 90 W. Va. 730, 111 S. E. 759 (1922).
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the purchase price. On October 5th, defendant discovered that the
sugar did not conform to the contract and immediately notified
plaintiff seller of its rejection. However, on October 30th, defend-
ant paid the first draft, believing that plaintiff would "adjust"
the matter. In an action by plaintiff to recover on the remaining
drafts, defendant pleaded failure of consideration, offered to re-
turn all the sugar, sought to cancel the drafts and to recover the
amount paid on the first one.
The court denied the right to rescind, stating: "We seem to
be committed to the principle followed by the English courts, that.
an executed sale cannot be rescinded for a breach of warranty, un-
accompanied by fr,.ud, or an agreement to rescind .... It is well
settled in this State that where the contract is executed, and war-
ranty is relied upon, rescission can not be had."
In support of these statements, the court cited Ellison v. Flat
Top Grocery Company7 and Eagle Glass & Manufacturing Com-
pany v. Pipe Company.8
The holding in the Ellison case was really based on other
grounds. There, the plaintiff contracted in writing to sell to de-
fendant 200 carloads of hay of a certain quality. From September
10, 1907, to June, 1908, plaintiff shipped 123 carloads, for which
defendant paid, adjustment having been made for nine cars con-
taining defective hay. Thereafter, defendant refused to accept two
other carloads containing defective hay, and "cancelled" the con-
tract. The court permitted plaintiff to recover damages for breach
of the contract, upon the ground that the tender of only two de-
fective carloads was an immaterial breach not justifying defendant
in refusing to continue with its own performance. As an alter-
native ground of decision, it was held that a contract must be re-
scinded in toto, and that was impossible since defendant could not
return the hay previously accepted.
In the second case cited, ° plaintiff bought from defendant
16,000 feet of casing, expressly warranted to be in good condition
and to stand not less than 100 pounds pressure. Upon its arrival
plaintiff rejected part of the pipe and used the remainder in lay-
ing a pipe line, paying in full for the part used. The line proved
7 69 W. Va. 380, 71 S. E. 391 (1911).
8 74 . Va. 228, 81 S. E. 976 (1914).
9 Cf. MeMullar Coal Co. v. Champion, etc. Co., 103 W. Va. 637, 138 S. E. 755
(1929) ; contract for the sale of 100,000 tons of coal. The buyer, having ac-
cepted 46,164 tons, was denied the right to cancel the contract.
10 74 W. Va. 228, 81 S. B. 976 (1914).
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to be defective and plaintiff took it up and returned it to the rail-
road station where it had been received. The court denied the
right to rescind and recover the purchase price, saying:
"It is true that in some of the American states a vendee
may rescind an executed sale because of the breach of a war-
ranty, and claim as damages what he paid and expended. But
such is not the principle of the English law, nor of many
American jurisdictions. [Citing authorities.] .... Nor have
we ever understood that with us an executed sale could be
rescinded because of a mere breach of warranty unaccom-
panied by fraud or an agreement to rescind [citing Ellison
case]. If the warranty is broken, the executed sale neverthe-
less stands. The breach of warranty can not in principle oper-
ate to revest in the seller the title that passed to the buyer. The
purchaser must retain the property, but he may have damages
for the breach of warranty made to him about it."
The case is probably correct, since the facts seem to show that
the plaintiff failed to rescind promptly after discovery of the
breach of warranty.
It is submitted that these cases were all correctly decided:
the American Sugar case upon the ground of gcceptance of the
goods by failure to return them and by payment of the purchase
price; the Manufacturing Company case, because of loss of the
right of rescission after discovery of a latent defect; and the
Ellison case because the question there was only of the right to
rescind the contract, not the executed sale. If the facts in these
cases are considered, there is little to justify the broad statement
of the rule denying the right to rescind an executed sale.
On the other hand, we have Kemble v. Wiltison." In that
case, there was a sale of specific goods. Plaintiff sold to defendant
a second-hand automobile, warranting it to be in first-class condi-
tion. Defendant executed a promissory note for the purchase price.
Within a few days after receiving the car, defendant tested it,
found it was not in such condition, offered to return it, and de-
manded surrender of his note. In an action by plaintiff upon the
note, the court held for the defendant. It seems desirable to quote
at length from the opinion:
"Plaintiff insists that inasmuch as this was an executed
sale, 1he defendant Wiltison did not have any right to rescind
it and return the property, but that if there was a breach of
the warranty he must keep the property and sue for dam-
"92 W. Va. 32, 114 S. E. 369 (1922).
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ages on the warranty, or, in case he was sued for the purchase
price, recoup such damages. There is no doubt but that he
could do this, but is he bound to resort to that remedy? There
was formerly considerable contrariety of opinion among the
courts as to whether or not the purchaser of personal property
could return the same upon discovering that it did not meet
the requirements of a warranty, or whether he must keep the
property and sue for damages for the breach of the warranty.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court announced the
rule that where the title to the property had passed to the
purchaser, and there was an express warranty, the purchaser
had the right to inspect or test the property to see whether it
compiled with the warranty, and if it was found that it did
not so comply, he might return it to the seller and rescind the
contract. This rule, known as the Massachusetts Rule, was
followed by many of the courts in this country. The New
York Court of Appeals, on the other hand announced the rule
that where the title to the property had passed, the purchaser
could not return the property, upon discovering that it did
not comply with the seller's warranty, but must retain it and
sue for damages for breach of the warranty. This rule,
known as the New York Rule, was followed by a considerable
number of other states. The Uniform Sales Act recognizes the
Massachusetts Rule as the correct one, and this Act has been
adopted by a considerable majority of the American states, in
fact by all of the great commercial states. Professor Williston
in his work on Sales, while presenting both views, also takes
the view that the Massachusetts Rule is the correct one .....
We think it may be laid down as the law controlling in a case
like this, that where the seller of personal property has ex-
pressly warranted it, the buyer, upon delivery of the property
to him, even though the title has passed and vested in him,
may rescind the contract upon discovering that the warranty
has been broken, provided he acts promptly and does not so
use the property as to indicate that he has unequivocally ac-
cepted it in satisfaction of the contract."
The court then distinguished Manufacturing Company v. Pipe
Company"2 and 07io, etc. Co. v. Smith'3 upon the ground that in
those cases the buyers had lost the right of rescission by failure to
exercise it promptly. In the latter case, there was an executed sale
of steel piling, part of which the buyer had used and could not
return. For this reason, rescission was properly denied.
We thus have a definite holding in the Kemble case, that there
may be rescission of an executed sale of specific goods for breach
12 74 W. Va. 228, 81 S. E. 976 (1914).
'3 76 W. Va. 503, 85 S. E. 671 (1915).
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of an express warranty. We have the American Sugar case, which
may be viewed as holding that the buyer cannot rescind where he
has "accepted" goods tendered by the seller in performance of a
pre-existing contract for the sale of unspecified goods, the defect
being such as could reasonably be discovered by inspection. In
Gibson v. Adams,14 it was held that the right of rescission must
be exercised within a reasonable time after its discovery, other-
wise it will be lost.
Where the contract contemplates instalment deliveries, as in
Norman Lumber Company v. Keystone Manufacturing Company,"
or is severable, 16 as in Regent Waist Company v. MorrisoA Depart-
ment Store'7 it was held that the buyer may refuse to accept goods
not conforming to the contract and keep those which do conform.
It seems, therefore, that the statement in an authoritative
text' s placing West Virginia in that group of states which deny
the right of rescission of an executed sale, is not an accurate one.
The basic idea of the right is that the buyer ought to get the
thing he agreed to pay for- not something of less value plus a
right of action for the difference. He ought not to have a title
forced upon him which he had no proper opportunity to reject.
R. T. D.
14 98 W. Va. 671, 127 S. E. 514 (1925).
'5 100 W. Va. 515, 131 S. E. 12 (1925).
16 It is a question of some difficulty to determine when. the contract is sever-
able. See Hartland Colliery Co. v. Burns, etc. Co., 112 W. Va. 44, 163 S. E.
714 (1932).
17 88 W. Va. 303, 106 S. E. 712 (1921).
18 WumSTOx, SAus (2d ed. 1924) § 608a.
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